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Résumé 
Cet article développe un modèle évolutionniste de dynamique industrielle dans le but de 
mener une analyse théorique plus riche des conséquences d’un système de brevet plus 
restrictif. Les premiers résultats que nous obtenons dans cet article tendent à conforter les 
arguments contre le système de brevet : un bien-être social plus élevée et un progrès 
technique plus forts sont observés dans les industries avec un système de brevet plus doux 
(avec une hauteur de brevet plus faible et une durée légale de brevet plus courte). 
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This article develops an evolutionary model of industry dynamics in order to carry out a richer
theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. The ﬁrst results obtained in
our article are rather consistent with the anti-patent arguments and they do not favour the case for
a stronger patent system: higher social welfare and technical progress are observed in our model in
industries with milder patent systems (lower patent height and patent life).
Keywords: Innovation, Technical progress, Patent system, Intellectual property rights (IPR), Tech-
nology policy
JEL Classiﬁcation: O3, O34, L521 Introduction
The demand for a stronger patenting system has become in the recent period a major source of
tension between the U.S. government and the E.U. (see the recent debate on the software patents).
The US demand is generally motivated by the conventional economic wisdom aﬃrming that a strong
patenting system yields convenient incentives for the private investment in Research and Development
(R&D) and hence, for technical progress in Society. This rather mechanistic approach of technological
dynamics and of the role of the patenting is mainly based on the neoclassical theory of technical
progress that strongly focuses on the agents’ incentives rather than on the dynamics of the existent
technological systems.
1.1 What is a patent?
The US Patent and Trademaks Oﬃce (USPTO) gives the following deﬁnition on its web site:
A patent for an invention is the grant of a property right to the inventor, issued by the United
States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce. Generally, the term of a new patent is 20 years from the date
on which the application for the patent was ﬁled in the United States or, in special cases, from
the date an earlier related application was ﬁled, subject to the payment of maintenance fees.(...)
The right conferred by the patent grant is, in the language of the statute and of the grant itself,
“the right to exclude others from making, using, oﬀering for sale, or selling” the invention in the
United States or “importing” the invention into the United States. (...) Once a patent is issued,
the patentee must enforce the patent without aid of the USPTO. [US Patent and Trademaks
Oﬃce legal web site1]
This deﬁnition puts a particular stress on the role of a patent as a certiﬁcate of a private ownership
of an invention. This ownership gives to the inventor the right to exclude anyone from the provision
of this invention in the US. From the point of view of the inventor, the beneﬁts of this exclusivity (the
monopoly rent) should be opposed to the costs of ﬁling and maintaining a patent. These dimensions
of the patent system directly follow from the theoretical arguments that have been used to defend
the establishment of patent systems during the 19th century patent controversy.
1.2 Arguments for a patent system?
Following the arguments that have been developed by the defendants of a patent system during the
patent controversy of the 19th century, a patent is
• the natural property right in ideas;
• the just reward for the inventor;
• the best incentive to invent;
• the best incentive to disclose secret information.
These arguments are based on the assumption that the main motivation of an intentional inno-
vation is the monopoly rent that can be obtained using a superior technology or product.
Modern theoretical arguments emphasize the particularities of new technical knowledge for jus-
tifying the necessity of protecting the intellectual property rights. Following these arguments,
• the knowledge has two important characteristics: nonrivalry and nonexcludability;
• the technical knowledge is a source of externalities in R&D.
1http://www.uspto.gov/
1These two dimensions can imply an underprovision of this public good. As a consequence, the
correct incentives must be established through a temporary monopoly position and the public dis-
closure of private information. These arguments have regularly been questioned by the opponents
of a strong patent system. This is quite natural given that patent systems concern the reallocating
rents in Society and possess, as such, a political dimension.
1.3 Some stylized facts about patenting
Following van Dijk (1994), Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000), Gallini & Scotchmer (2002), Hall (2002)
and Mansﬁeld (1986), we can specify some stylized facts about patenting:
• Most patentable innovations are patented (the exact proportion is industry-speciﬁc);
• Inventing around a patent occurs (with an average cost advantage of 35%);
• Most innovations combine elements from existing products;
• The eﬀective lifetime of a patent is generally shorter than the legal lifetime (less than 8 years
for the 50% of the patents in UK and France);
• Patents are useful to impede imitation: the supplementary imitation cost due to the existence
of a patent is industry-speciﬁc and weights from 7% to 30%);
• The propensity of patenting has heavily increased in the last decade. This propensity is
industry-speciﬁc and it is higher for larger ﬁrms.
There are more than four million patents in force in the world today, and every year applications
are ﬁled for a further 700 000 inventions. In 2002, the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) received over
160 000 patent applications. The Figure 1 clearly shows the explosion of the number of patent
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Figure 1: Applications to the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO)
21.4 Behind the incentives
Is patenting the only tool for protecting an innovation? The results of the 1994 Carnegie Mellon
Survey of the U.S. manufacturing sector are summarized in Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000) . Following
these results, ﬁrms declare that they have at their disposal a variety of tools, and they do not
necessarily prefer patents to other means for protecting their innovations. In fact, Firms’ declarations






The secrecy is considered by the ﬁrms as the most eﬀective mechanism for protecting process in-
novations while the lead time is considered to be slightly more eﬀective for product innovations. This
survey clearly shows that the main motivation for patenting does not correspond to the theoretical
argument used in the defence of a stronger patenting policy (better incentives for R&D).
This observation, combined with the recent surge in patenting gives rise to what is called today
the patent paradox (low eﬀectiveness but high patenting, see Hall & Ziedonis (2001) for electronics
ﬁrms).
Patenting is mainly used by ﬁrms for strategic reasons: constructing patent fences around discrete
inventions; building a negotiation power through a patent portfolio in complex industries, especially
for cross-licensing issues, etc. This strategic use of the patent system must be taken into account in
the evaluation of its social costs and beneﬁts. Patent systems are promoted on the basis that they
are the least expensive means to provide incentives for innovation. Anti-patent movement argues
that patents are ineﬃcient and expensive: the costs of bureaucracy (strongly increased during the
recent patent surge – see Figure 1), court personnel and lawyers make the patent system very costly
and unattractive. These costs add to the welfare lost due to monopoly granted by the patent system.
Even worst, building patent fences around discrete innovations can constitute patent thickets implying
strong dynamical ineﬃciencies in the innovation systems.
The social cost of defensive patenting (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000)) follows from the fact
that, in these cases, patenting does not foster inventions. Merges & Nelson (1990) and Mazzoleni
& Nelson (1998) emphasize the complex nature of the dynamics of technology in many industries.
Merges & Nelson (1990) show that a stronger patent system can have very diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent
industries. They distinguish four classes of technologies in which the role of patents can be strongly
contrasted: discrete inventions (new pharmaceuticals), cumulative technologies (aircraft), chemical
technologies and science-based technologies (biotechnology).
A ”one size ﬁts all” system of intellectual property rights seems quite illusionary and can sometime
imply strong social dynamic costs by blocking the development of complementary innovations or of
better substitutes. The diversity-reduction eﬀect of broad patents on prospect opening inventions
can imply high social costs. As a consequence, models of innovation and of patenting must take
into account the complexity of diﬀerent technological regimes while evaluating the global impact of
a stronger patent system and of its dimensions (mainly scope and length). An agent based approach
of the industrial system, composed of boundedly rational ﬁrms, can help us to locate main issues
in this debate. Moreover, at the more speciﬁc level of the patent race models, the main results
are generally too strongly sensitive to the rational expectations (or perfect foresight) assumption
and to the assumed homogeneity of the ﬁrms (see Silverberg & Yildizoglu (2002) for a discussion
3of this problem in the context of the Aghion & Howitt (1992) model). The main results of this
literature should be tested against more realistic assumptions before using them in the analysis of
the intellectual property regimes. This article develops an evolutionary model of industry dynamics,
aiming to enhance our theoretical understanding of the consequences of a stronger patent system.
The next section will quickly present the main characteristics of our model. The third section will be
dedicated to the presentation of our simulation protocol and of the ﬁrst results of the basic model.
Last section will conclude the article.
2 The Model
This model concerns an industry producing a homogenous good and facing a decreasing market
demand. The only production factor is the physical capital and the technology has constant returns
to scale (it is linear). In each period, each ﬁrm shares its gross proﬁts between diﬀerent investment
outlets: R&D, physical capital, patent budget, saving (equity) and distribution of dividends. The
R&D investment of the ﬁrm is necessary for the imitative and innovative activity of the ﬁrm, and
these are the only source of productivity gains in the model. Technical progress is disembodied and
it corresponds to the increase of the productivity of the ﬁrm’s capital stock.
The industry is initially populated using ﬁrms with random characteristics (drawn following a
normal distribution centered around common averages). Given their characteristics, ﬁrms produce
following their production function. The short-period market equilibrium ﬁxes the price at which the
consumers accept to buy this production given their demand in each period. Market price determines
the ﬁrm’s gross proﬁts and these proﬁts are used for investing on diﬀerent assets (strategies): innova-
tion and imitation follows from the R&D investment; physical capital increases as a consequence of
the investment; patent budget is used to ﬁnance new patents of the renewal of the patent portfolio of
the ﬁrm; dividends are distributes to the consumers and they can increase their demand; the equity is
used as saving and can provide supplementary revenues for investing in future periods (see Figure 2).
We dedicate in this model a particular attention to the patenting strategies of the ﬁrms.
Figure 2: The main connections in the model
In the rest of this section we will brieﬂy present main components of the model.
42.1 Strategies and learning processes of ﬁrms
At the beginning of each period, the ﬁrm must decide how to spend the gross proﬁts and the savings
from the previous periods. In our model, these revenues can be allocated between ﬁve alternative
assets (see the Figure 2):
Investment in physical capital: The ﬁrms expands its capital stock in order to increase its market
share. IKRATE is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies
of the ﬁrms are created.
R&D investment: R&D allows the ﬁrm to create new technologies, or to imitate technology of a
successful competitor. The obsolescence cost on the R&D stock, for a given ﬁrm, depends
on its relative productivity, compared to the maximum level of productivity in the industry.
Hence, if a ﬁrm’s productivity is low compared to the maximum level of productivity in the
industry, it’s R&D stock will be subject to a high degree of obsolescence. As a consequence,
the ﬁrm with the highest productivity in the industry faces no obsolescence cost. Thus, even
without any new speciﬁc investment, a leading ﬁrm will be able to keep constant its R&D stock.
IRDRATE is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies of
the ﬁrms are created.
Patent budget: In order to prevent other ﬁrms from beneﬁting from its own technological invest-
ments, a company can decide to protect an innovation. We assume that a technology may only
be patented if it is suﬃciently distinct from an already patented technology. The patent oﬃce
can be more or less indulgent and this dimension of the patent system is measured in our model
by the variable PATENTHEIGHT. A patented technology can be protected for a maximum
of PATENTLIFE periods. A new patent costs NEWPATENTCOST and renewing a patent
for a period necessitates the payment of RENEWPATENCOST. PATENTRATE is the
initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies of the ﬁrms are created.
Dividends: Companies can redistribute a part of their proﬁts to shareholders and thus to households.
In this simpliﬁed model, this is the only way by which the total demand increases. The coeﬃ-
cient that transforms the distributed dividends into demand increases is γ. DIV IDENDRATE
is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies of the ﬁrms are
created.
Savings: Companies can save, either voluntarily and/or involuntary, part of their proﬁts. Involun-
tary savings arise when one of the budgets lines is not spent in its totality. This saving is
precautionary since it enables a company to oﬀset certain consequences of unforeseen events
(e.g. negative proﬁts). In our model if a company experiences negative proﬁts and does not
have any more saving, it quits the industry. EQUITY RATE is the initial average value of this
investment rate around which the strategies of the ﬁrms are created.
In each period, the learning of the ﬁrms is represented through a evolutionary algorithm: ﬁrms
learn through imitation of the strategies of the others and through random experimenting (muta-
tions). In our model, imitation is based on the market size of the opponents, rather than on their
proﬁts (like in Silverberg & Verspagen (1994)). As a consequence, a bigger competitor will have
a higher probability of being imitated. These two mechanisms are respectively commanded by the
probabilities PROBMIMITATE and PROBMUTATE.
2.2 Technical progress and patenting
Technical progress is a result of innovation or imitation processes of ﬁrms. The success of these
processes is an increasing function of the R&D investment of the ﬁrms. Firms may ﬁle patents in
order to protect their technologies from imitation by competitors.
5Productivity gains: innovation and imitation
In our model, innovation is a two-stage stochastic process. A ﬁrst draw determines if the ﬁrm has
been successful to innovate. The probability of this success is increasing with the R&D investment.
A second draw then gives the eﬀective new productivity that results from the innovation.
It should be noted that a new technology may only be used and patented if it is not covered by
an existing patent.
A ﬁrm can also beneﬁt from imitating a successful competitor’s technology. Imitation is rather
rare and the probability of its success is again increasing with the R&D investment of the ﬁrm.
Only unpatented technologies can be imitated. When the imitation happens, each competitor has a
probability of being imitated that increases with its market share.
Patenting
The management of the patent portfolio is very crucial in our model. In this version we do not
allow any sleeping patents. Hence, when a new technology is found, the inventor can choose to protect
it by ﬁling a patent. If the ﬁrm does not protect it, this technology may be imitated or invented
around by the competitors. A ﬁrm will only desire to patent a technology if a) the technology is seen
as suﬃciently interesting to patent, and b) the ﬁrms disposes of a suﬃcient budget. More speciﬁcally,
the probability of adopting (or keeping) a particular patent is given by a normal distribution that
depends on the relative eﬃciency of the technology. Eﬃciency of a given technology is measured by
the number of ﬁrms with a productivity lower than the productivity of this technology: the higher
this number of such ﬁrms, the more eﬃcient the patenting. We assume that ﬁrms cannot perfectly
observe the eﬃciency of their innovation and they are prone to errors.
Management of the patent budget
In the beginning of each period, the ﬁrm will try to reserve a budget for patenting. This budget
should cover two kind of expenses: a) the cost of maintaining previously ﬁled patents, b) the possible
cost of ﬁling a patent for a new innovation. This budget will result from the investment strategy of
the ﬁrm on patenting.
2.3 Entry and exit
In this model, the size of the industry, in terms of active ﬁrms, is allowed to change at each period.
Nevertheless, an upper bound is ﬁxed, which is the initial size N.
Even with negative proﬁts, a ﬁrm may stay in the industry as long as it holds some positive
savings that oﬀset this loss. When this is no longer the case, the ﬁrm exists the industry (the case
of bankruptcy). If the number of active ﬁrms is lower than N at the beginning of a period, some
new ﬁrms may enter into the industry. For example persistent high proﬁts or increases of the level
of proﬁts in an industry may be an attractive signal for new entry. When entry happens, the char-
acteristics of the new ﬁrms are drawn from values around the industry-averages. If a potential new
entrant is not proﬁtable at the current market price, and/or if the technology found by it is patented,
the potential ﬁrm will not be able to enter. The probability of entry is ENTRY PROB. The entry
is also limited, in our model, by the inverse Herﬁndhal concentration index.
2.4 The pseudo-code of the model
We start with a population of N ﬁrms in the industry. We assume that each ﬁrm is initialized with
random strategies that are drawn from the same normal distributions.
The algorithm of the model runs the following steps in each period t:
1. Populating the industry:
• if t = 1: creation of an industry composed of N ﬁrms
6• if t > 1: death and birth process
2. For each period t, until t = T :
(a) Computation of the production levels: Qi
t and the total supply Qt
(b) if t > 1 evolution of the demand Dt (depends on past dividend strategies)
(c) Computation of the intra-period price (as a function of the inverse demand function): pt
(d) Randomize the order of play of ﬁrms in the current period t
(e) Computation of the gross proﬁts
(f) Deﬁnition of the diﬀerent budget levels for R&D, investment, patent budget, savings and
dividends
(g) Computation of the list of all patented productivities in the industry
(h) Imitation of technologies
(i) Innovation of ﬁrms
(j) Management of the patent portfolio and patenting
(k) Diﬀusion of the best strategies in the industry (depends on the market shares of the ﬁrms)
(l) Mutation of strategies: possible change of the individual set of strategy rates
3 Simulation protocol and ﬁrst results
3.1 Simulation protocol
Given the complexity of the interactions we model, we adopt a methodology that allows quite a
systematic exploration of the parameter space of the model. This methodology is close to the Monte-
Carlo method. We run 1000 series of 500 periods2 each where the results from each period has a
probability of 2% of being saved. So, for each run we obtain an average number of 10 randomly
chosen observations for all the measured variables. The simulations are initialized with a randomly
drawn vector of values for the main parameters of the model. As a result, we obtain a set of 10 000
observations covering quite a diversiﬁed subset of the parameter space. The values from which
diﬀerent parameters are drawn can be read in the Appendix A. We do not necessarily discuss in the
text all the parameters that appear in this appendix but only the most signiﬁcant ones. We analyze






. We use for this analysis box plots (giving the four quartiles of the
distributions of the variables), Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests between subsets, and regression trees.
The statistical analysis is conducted using R (see Team (2003)).
3.2 First results on patents and social welfare
The Table 1 gives the signiﬁcative inﬂuence of the dimensions of the patent system on some of our
aggregate indicators (market price, productivities, number of ﬁrms...). We only present here the
inﬂuences that are statistically signiﬁcative at a unilateral level higher than 5% in linear regressions
computed between each of the dependent variables and the indicated four dimensions of the patent
system.
Table 1 indicates that a stronger patent system (with a longer PATENTLIFE, and a more indul-
gent patent oﬃce corresponding to a stronger PATENTHEIGHT) would imply higher concentration,
market prices and proﬁts. These beneﬁts for the ﬁrms in the economy would also have a social cost
2Running 1000 simulations is suﬃciently robust and secure in our case since σ
2/¯ x becomes stable after 500 runs for
any variable x in our model.
7Variable PL PH NPC RNPC
price + +
maxprod − − +
averprod − − +




nbpat + − −
cumnbpat + − −
maxpatage + + + −
nbpatfirms + − + −
Behaviors
avpatrate + − −
avirdrate − − + +
avikrate + −
avequitrate − + −
avdivrate + −
PL: PATENTLIFE PN: PATENTHEIGTH
NPC: NEWPATENTCOST RNPC: RENEWPATENTCOST
Table 1: The role the characteristics of the patent system t ≥ Qt
2 = 254
in terms of technical progress since the average and maximal productivity would be lower under such
a system. This phenomenon would also be concomitant with longer eﬀective patent lives and fewer
innovations. The inﬂuence of the cost dimensions is rather obvious and marginal.
Would these inﬂuences necessarily yield a lower social welfare? Answering this question using
only the market price is not very straightforward in our model since, when distributed as dividends,
the proﬁts increase the revenues of the consumers and yield a higher consumers’ surplus. As a
consequence, a higher price does not automatically imply in our model a lower consumer’ surplus.
This is even more likely given the increasing relationship between the PATENTLIFE and the average
dividend rate of the ﬁrms (see the last line of Table 1). So, we must take a better look at the social
welfare for judging its evolution under a stronger patent system.







































































Figure 3: Patent strength and social welfare





















































Figure 4: Determinants of Social Surplus
The Figure 3 gives the distribution of the social welfare (consumers’ surplus and total social
surplus3) for diﬀerent patent systems: for each of the dimensions (PATENTLIFE and PATEN-
THEIGHT) we call ”low” the value of this dimension if it is lower than the second quantile of this
variable and we call it ”high” otherwise. The conﬁguration hl corresponds, for example, to a sit-
uation where the PATENTLIFE is high and the PATENTHEIGHT is low. As it is is shown
by the boxplot4, the highest social surplus is observed when both dimensions are lower and, hence,
the patent system is milder. Non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests5 conﬁrm this graphical
result. As a consequence, the positive impact of a stronger patent system on the proﬁts of the ﬁrms
does not ﬁnally overweight the negative impact on consumers’ welfare. This result casts a shadow on
the admitted social eﬃciency of strong intellectual property rights. Moreover, the similarity between
the conﬁgurations hh and lh on the one hand and between hl and ll on the other indicates that the
PATENTHEIGHT dominates the impact of the patent system on social surplus. This point calls
for a more detailed analysis of the determinants of social welfare in our model.
We analyze the role of diﬀerent parameters of the model using regression trees (Venables and
Ripley [1999], chapter 10). A regression tree establishes a hierarchy between independent variables
using their contributions to the overall ﬁt
¡
R2¢
of the regression. More exactly, it splits the set of
observations in sub-classes characterized by their value in terms of their contribution to the overall
ﬁt and of their predictions for the dependent variables (all parameters that are modiﬁed by the
Monte Carlo procedure are included as explanatory variables in each of the following regressions).
This value is validated against a fraction (10%) of the sample that is not used during the estimation.
Regression trees are very ﬂexible and powerful in the clariﬁcation of the structure of the observations.
The tree gives a hierarchical sequence of conditions on the variables of the model: the higher the
role of a condition in the classiﬁcation of the observed cases, the higher its status on the tree. For
each condition, the left branch gives the cases for which the condition is true and the right branch
3Social suplus=Consumers’ surplus+Total proﬁts of the ﬁrms.
4These boxplots show four quartiles of the distributions of our indicators: the statistically signiﬁcant minimum and
the maximum correspond to the extreme end of the whiskers, while Q1 and Q3 correspond to the edges of the central
box and the median corresponds to the horizontal line inside the box.
5The statistical appendix can be obtained from the following address: http://beagle.u-
bordeaux4.fr/yildi/ﬁles/tvmy1appendix.pdf.
9gives the cases that are compatible with the complementary condition. We give now a step-by-step
interpretation of the main elements of the regression tree exposed in Figure 4.
The Figure 4 shows that the main determinant of the social welfare in this model is the de-
mand eﬀect of the distributed dividends. γ is the coeﬃcient through which dividends are trans-
formed into supplementary demand by the consumers. The top ﬁrst branching of the Figure 4 shows
that the social surplus is the lowest one (log(SS) = 10.47 ⇒ SS = 35242.22) when this coeﬃcient
is very small (the left branch: γ < 0.008993). 2703 observations in our model correspond to this
case. When γ is higher, the second component of this demand eﬀect enters onto the scene: the
initial average dividend rate (DIV IDENDRATE) around which the ﬁrms are initialized during
the creation of the industry. The highest social welfare is obtained in the model when this value
is very high (DIV IDENDRATE ≥ 0.8674 - the highest result corresponding to log(SS) = 19.06
can only be obtained in the right branch of this test). If the dividend rate is more reasonable
(DIV IDENDRATE < 0.8674 - the right branch), γ distinguishes again two sets of cases: on the
left, we have the cases where γ < 0.01686 and, on the right the ones with γ ≥ 0.01686. The ﬁrst
set of cases conﬁrms again the preponderant role played by the demand eﬀect in our model. We
should also note an interesting result that concerns the role played by the cost of new patents:
the highest welfare in this case is obtained when ﬁrms distribute large dividends and when the
NEWPATENTCOST is higher (so that they issue fewer patents given the lower resources dedi-
cated to patenting and the higher cost of each patent). The second set of cases (corresponding to
γ ≥ 0.01686 and DIV IDENDRATE < 0.8674) is more interesting. In this case, the highest social
welfare (log(SS) = 17.31 ⇒ SS = 32 933 469) is observed when i) initially ﬁrms do enough invest
in physical capital (IKRATE ≥ 0.21), ii) the height of the granted patents is not too high or too
low (PATENTHEIGHT ∈ [1.138,2.124]) and iii) the depreciation of the technological knowledge
is not too strong (α < 0.1207). When PATENTHEIGHT < 1.318, the highest welfare is obtained
when the oﬃcial patent life is nil and thus patents do not play any positive role on the proﬁts of the
ﬁrms (PATENTLIFE < 0.5 ⇔ PATENTLIFE = 0). These results show that under each set of
conditions concerning other variables, the welfare is higher when the patent system is milder.

























Figure 5: Determinants of average productivity
What about the technological eﬀects of the characteristics of the patent system?
The Figure 5 ﬁrst shows that the technical progress is the lowest when the PATENTHEIGHT
is very high (> 2.734), and hence the patent oﬃce is very indulgent. The predominant role played
by this dimension of the patent system conﬁrms the result of Figure 3. For lower heights, the role





not really have a consequence on the technical progress itself but on the nature of the model, since
two diﬀerent dimensions of learning play an important and distinct role in each of these two sets of
cases. When the patent life is very low, random exploration of strategies represented by the mutation
operator must remain very weak (PROBMUMATE < 0.0285%) in order for the industry to attain
the highest productivities. When the allowed maximal life of the patents is longer, some signiﬁcant
entry (ENTRY PROB > 0.726%) and learning through imitation (PROBIMITATE ≥ 0.45%) are
necessary for transforming lower investments rates on physical capital (IKRATE < 0.1568) to the
highest productivities for the industry. When the patent life allows a signiﬁcant role for the patents,
the learning of strategies, and the budget constraint that binds together all strategies, become crucial
for technical progress. Moreover, we can check that these results are conformant with the main result
of the Figure 3. That is, the highest average productivity (2877) is compatible with the conﬁguration
(hl) (high patentlife and low patentheight). The Figure 3 shows that this conﬁguration provides a
higher consumer’s surplus than the conﬁguration (ll): the higher the average productivity, the lower
the price, and, the higher the consumer’s surplus.
The Figure 5 also demonstrates the role of learning and diversity in technical progress: in both
cases (with low or high patentlife), a lower ENTRY PROB decreases the average productivity.
This result is quite normal, since a lower value of this variable implies a lower degree of diversity
of the strategies and the technologies of the ﬁrms and, hence, a possibly higher degree of market
concentration. The latter can of course lead to fewer innovations and, consequently, to a lower
average productivity in the industry.
4 Conclusion
”If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge
of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to
recommend abolishing it.” (Machlup (1958) – Cited by Hall (2002)).
This article develops an evolutionary model of industry dynamics in order to carry out a richer
theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. Even if we agree with Machlup
that the question of abandoning the existing patent system cannot be easily posed, the necessity for
a stronger patent system, as it is defended by the North-American authorities must be questioned.
The ﬁrst results obtained in our article are rather consistent with the anti-patent arguments and
they do not favour the case for a stronger patent system: higher social welfare and technical progress
are observed in our model in industries with milder patent systems (lower patent height and patent
life).
We must now reﬁne this analysis in two directions. First, we must carry out a more detailed
analysis of individual results in order to better understand the mechanisms that are behind our
results. Second, we must develop a richer technology space in order to include in the analysis
diﬀerent technological regimes stressed by Merges & Nelson (1990). Only, with such an approach we
can have a more subtile and more realistic apprehension of the consequences of a stronger patent
system.
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12A Initialisation of the main parameters of the model
Exogenous variables
N = 50 : Number of ﬁrms
T = 500 : Number of periods
PROBIMITATE ∈ [0,0.005] : Probability of imitation
PROBMUTATE ∈ [0,0.005] : Probability of mutation
SIGMA IN ∈ [0.1,5] : Standard deviation of the innovative draws
DIV IDENDRATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the distributed dividends in the gross proﬁts
PATENTRATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the patent budget in the gross proﬁts
EQUITY RATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the savings in the gross proﬁts
IKRATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the investment in physical capital in the gross proﬁts
IRDRATE ∈ [0,1] : Initial average share of the R&D budget in the gross proﬁts
ENTRY PROB ∈ [0,0.01] : Probability of new entry
ALPHA ∈ [0,1] : Depreciation rate of the technological knowledge of the ﬁrm
GAMMA ∈ [0,0.02] : Transformation rate of dividends into supplementary demand
NEWPATENTCOST ∈ [0,5] : Cost of ﬁling a new patent
RENEWPATENTCOST ∈ [0,1] : Cost of renewing an existing patent
PATENTHEIGHT ∈ [0,5] : The height of the granted patents. If the patent correspond to the produc-
tivity A0, all productivities in [A0 − PATENTHEIGHT,A0 + PATENTHEIGHT] are protected
from the competitors.
PATENTLIFE ∈ [0,30] : Legal maximal life of patents
EQUITY ∈ [10,50] : Initial equity of the ﬁrms
CF ∈ [0,2] : Fixed costs of the ﬁrms
K ∈ [10,50] : Initial average capital stock of the ﬁrms
PROD ∈ [0.2,1.2] : Initial average productivity of the ﬁrms
COST ∈ [0,1] : Initial average unit using cost of the capital
DEM ∈ [300,1000] : Initial demand coeﬃcient
ETA ∈ 0.9 : Elasticity of demand
Endogenous variables
price : Market price
maxprod : Maximal productivity of the period
averprod : Average productivity of the period
activeN : Number of active ﬁrms in the industry
invCI : Inverse Herﬁndal index of the period
averprofit : Average proﬁts
nbinnov : Number of innovations in the period
nbpat : Total number of active patents in the period
cumbpat : Cumulated number of the patents in the industry history
maxpatage : Age of the oldest active patent
nbpatfirms : Number of patenting ﬁrms in the period
avpatrate : Average percentage of the patent budget in the gross proﬁts
avirdrate : Average percentage of the R&D budget in the gross proﬁts
avikrate : Average percentage of the capital investment budget in the gross proﬁts
avequitrate : Average percentage of the savings in the gross proﬁts
avdivrate : Average percentage of the distributed dividends in the gross proﬁts
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